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Both within and outside generative linguistic circles, it is often claimed that at 
least two factors determine organismic development, hence determine language 
development in humans. First, an innate capacity, perhaps species-specific as 
well, that allows humans (but not e.g. cats) to acquire linguistic systems such as 
the one you are now using to transduce ‘retinal images’ to meanings. The second 
factor is, of course, the environmental input. Thus, we have the standard 
dichotomy ‘nature vs. nurture’. The influence of the environment is amply 
demonstrated, for example, through naturalistic experimentation indicating that 
a normal child raised in Japan acquires ‘Japanese’, but one raised in the Philip-
pines develops ‘Tagalog’. Hence, the central role of the environment in language 
development.  
 However, it is important to remember—as has been noted before, but 
perhaps it remains underappreciated—that it is precisely the organism’s biology 
(nature) that determines what experience, in any domain, can consist of (see 
Chomsky 2009 (originally 1966) for discussion (and resurrection) of the 
Rationalist roots of the idea, especially pages 103–105, concerning Cudworth and 
Humboldt; more recently, see e.g. Gould & Marler 1987, Jackendoff 1994, Lust 
2006, Lewontin 2008, and Gallistel 2010). To clarify, a bee, for example, can 
perform its waggle dance for me a million times, but that ‘experience’, given my 
biological endowment, does not allow me to transduce the visual images of such 
waggling into a mental representation (knowledge) of the distance and direction 
to a food source. This is precisely what it does mean to a bee witnessing the exact 
same environmental event/waggle dance. Ultrasonic acoustic disturbances might 
be experience for my dog, but not for me. Thus, the ‘environment’ in this sense is 
not in fact the second factor, but rather, nurture is constituted of those aspects of 
the ill-defined ‘environment’ (which of course irrelevantly includes a K-mart 
store down the street from my house) that can in principle influence the 
developmental trajectory of one or more organs of a member of a particular 
species, given its innate endowment.  
                                                
  This manuscript was originally drafted in 2006 and has been used in my classroom teaching 
ever since. A number of people found it to be clarificatory and urged me to make it more 
widely available than in just my classes. I thank Biolinguistics for making this possible and 
especially two reviewers for helpful comments. Many thanks also to Kleanthes Grohmann, 
the editor, for his patience, valuable suggestions, and support. I am also indebted to Noam 
Chomsky. Without his support of this manuscript, it would never have made it outside the 
classroom. For extensive and invaluable discussion of the ideas expressed here I am very 
grateful to Elaine McNulty. Thanks also to Hisatsugu Kitahara, Rick Lewis, Jim McGilvray, 
and T. Daniel Seely for very helpful discussion. All errors are mine. 
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 In the biolinguistic domain, the logic is no different. The apparent fact that 
exposure to some finite threshold amount of ‘Tagalog’ acoustic disturbances in 
contexts (originating from outside the organism, in the ‘environment’) can cause 
any normal human infant to develop knowledge of ‘Tagalog’ is a property of 
human infants. Of course, even here as I seek to clarify, it is misleading but 
unfortunately terminologically unavoidable that I characterize the acoustic 
disturbance inputs as ‘Tagalog’ and the knowledge system internalized, as also 
‘Tagalog’, inviting the mis-inference that the acoustic input and the state attained 
(knowledge) are identical, a mis-inference often invited by claiming (even in 
some generative literature) that “the child is exposed to the language, or to 
sentences of the language”. The corresponding fact that exposure to a finite 
number of ‘Japanese’ acoustic disturbances can cause knowledge of ‘Japanese’ to 
develop in a human, is similarly a hypothesis about properties of human infants 
(indicating one respect in which they (we) differ from all known objects in the 
universe). Thus the standard statement that on the one hand, innate properties of 
the organism and, on the other, the environment, determine organismic develop-
ment, is profoundly misleading. It suggests that those environmental factors that 
can influence the development of particular types of organisms are definable, 
non-biologically—as the behaviorists sought, but of course failed, to define 
‘stimulus’ as an organism-external construct. We can’t know what the relevant 
develop-mental stimuli are or aren’t, without knowing the properties of the 
organism. Indeed, debates have raged, and continue to rage (I think 
unnecessarily) regard-ing this very nature–nurture dichotomy. Within the field 
of Linguistics, broadly construed, this is instantiated by the ongoing and 
contentious poverty of the stimulus ‘debate’ (where, perhaps importantly, 
‘stimulus’ is an illusory and failed behaviorist concept, precisely due to its purely 
externalist definition). But of course, organism external ‘stimuli’ cannot possibly 
suffice to explain any aspects of the developed adult state of any organism. In 
fact, all aspects of an organism’s development involve the organism, including 
the capacity of the organism to develop differently depending on the ‘experience’ 
the organism undergoes, or more precisely constructs, given its anatomical 
properties. It is a (conditionally stated) biological property of a normal human 
infant that, if exposed to these noises (or for sign language, certain perceived hand 
shapes in motion in fact, just photons hitting the retina), then the organism 
develops one way cognitively. If exposed to others (or none), its cognitive 
linguistic develop-ment follows another course. Other noises (e.g. jet planes) or 
perceived motion of limbs (e.g. watching the hands of a performing violinist) 
have no effect on this particular (i.e. linguistic) aspect of development. That very 
(slight) develop-mental indeterminacy on the one hand and (infinite) rigidity on 
the other—and their precise ranges—are defining properties of the organism, in 
the sense that they cannot be stated independently of the organism. The exact 
same variant exposure to ‘Tagalog’ vs. ‘Japanese’ finite acoustic disturbances has 
no corres-ponding effects on the development of a cat, as far as we know. So, in 
this case, the ‘environment’ is held constant, but the developmental trajectory of 
the two organisms differs. This then must be due to innate organismic differences 
in capacities enabling the conversion of experience into growth. The input to the 
language knower (acoustic disturbances) and the state attained (knowledge of 
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language) are vastly different, just as the nutritional input given to a tadpole and 
the frog anatomy it develops are not to be conflated (in this case or in any 
account of biological development).  
 Conversely, if the organism is held constant (two human infants) and the 
exposure is varied (a finite number of ‘Tagalog’ vs. ‘Japanese’ acoustic disturb-
ances hitting the eardrum), then any differences in the development of the two 
infants must be due—not to ‘the environment’ as is usually confusingly stated—but to 
a species-level property by which these variant exposures are mapped to those 
particular developmental trajectories resulting in particular anatomical (includ-
ing mental) states. In this sense, ‘language variation’ (in humans) is, contra much 
standard locution, innate (biologically constrained), as was instantiated clearly in, 
for example, the Government and Binding/Principles and Parameters Theory of 
Chomsky (1981), wherein the parameters (with unspecified values) were of 
course part of the innate endowment, delimiting the possible range of variation 
that could in principle be attained. That is, it is a defining property of the species 
that the possible class of variant developmental trajectories is determinable by 
variant experiences of a particular type. Again, experience is constructed by the 
organism’s innate properties, and is very different from ‘the environment’ or the 
behaviorist notion of ‘stimulus’. As Kleanthes Grohmann (p.c.) points out, the 
use of the (organism-independent, externalist) term ‘data’ in ‘primary linguistic 
data’ (Chomsky 1965) may also be misunderstood, as the exact same external 
data has differential effects on different organisms given their internal constitu-
tion (see among others Lightfoot 1989 and much subsequent work). As Descartes 
importantly noted, regarding the environmental input: 
 
Nothing reaches our mind from external objects through the sense organs 
except certain corporeal motions […] But neither the motions themselves nor 
the figures arising from them are conceived by us exactly as they occur in 
the sense organs […] Hence it follows that the very ideas [e.g. phonemes, 
syntactic categories, meanings,  laws, rules, representations, constraints, in 
fact, all postulates proposed by linguists, none of which occur in the 
environmental input—SDE] of the motions themselves and of the figures are 
innate in us. (Descartes 1648/1985: 303–304) 
 
Simply put, the ‘environmental input’ (for e.g. spoken language) is some finite 
number of acoustic disturbances, while the cognitive state attained (linguistic 
knowledge of e.g. syntax, semantics, phonology, morphology, and their inter-
actions) is not acoustic nor does the knowledge system developed by the lang-
uage learner display finite generative capacity. 
 Contrary to the implication of the standard nature vs. nurture dichotomy, 
‘nurture’ is then itself definable only in terms of nature, and ‘human language 
variation’ is a species property or capacity frequently characterized, inaccurately 
as: ‘that which is not innate’.  
 As a final note, even though Chomsky himself played a, or more likely, the 
central role in illuminating this very crucial distinction between ‘environment’ 
(or the behaviorist notion of ‘stimulus’) on the one hand and organismic 
experience on the other, even his writing does not invariably make explicit the 
profoundly important and subtle differences he reveals. Thus, for example, 
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Chomsky (2005: 1) writes that three factors determine human language develop-
ment: “genetic endowment (the topic of Universal Grammar), experience, and 
principles that are language- or even organism-independent”. But expressed this 
way, experience—or more precisely, that which can be experienced, as deter-
mined by an organism’s anatomical (including cognitive) constitution, as 
opposed to that which is experienced by a particular organism (as determined by 
historical contingency, Chomsky’s clear intent here)—is not entirely transparent.  
 Thus in addition to distinguishing the externalist notions of ‘environment/ 
stimulus’ from the internalist concept ‘experience’, Chomsky’s revolution import-
antly embraces two distinct (perhaps confusable) but very closely related inter-
pretations of ‘experience’: 
 
(1) That which is experiencable given an organism’s constitution 
 (see e.g. at least as early as Chomsky 1966 as well as Chomsky 1975). 
 
(2) That which a particular organism actually happens to experience in its 
particular lifetime.  
 
The latter is determined by a combination of (i) what an organism can possibly 
experience as determined by its biological constitution and (ii) historical contin-
gency. Thus the fact that I experienced tokens of the (not invariant) acoustic dis-
turbance ‘cat’ as containing three ordered phonemes, each a bundle of distinctive 
features, with the initial one mapped to its aspirated allophonic variant, was 
made possible by my innate language capacities (universal phonology/phon-
etics), while the fact that I was exposed to these particular acoustic disturbances 
and not to, say, multiple (acoustically distinct) occurrences of gato was an acci-
dent of where I happened to grow up. 
 What I happen to in fact experience is thus necessarily a proper subset of 
what I can experience, and thus to (at least, ordinally) distinguish the first factor 
(genetic endowment) from a second factor defined as ‘experience’ may lead 
(human) readers to a confusing (linguistic) experience, the avoidance of which is 
naturally worth nurturing. Finally, certain aspects of experience are presumably 
due to third factor properties of the organism as well, and it is an empirical issue 
to distinguish which aspects of experience are constructed by uniquely linguistic 
capacities from those constructed by more general laws, or by some interaction of 
the two. But, if indeed there are a trinity of factors, as seems unavoidable, then 
not only is the ‘vs.’ in ‘nature vs. nurture’ a false opposition, but its binarity is 
singularly unnatural.   
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